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If Separation of Church and State 
Doesn’t Demand Separating Religion 
from Politics, Does Christian Doctrine 
Require It? 
Samuel W. Calhoun∗ 
Abstract 
This Essay responds to comments by Wayne Barnes, Ian 
Huyett, and David Smolin on my prior Article, Separation of 
Church and State: Jefferson, Lincoln, and the Reverend Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Show It Was Never Intended to Separate 
Religion From Politics. Part II, although noting a few 
disagreements with Huyett and Smolin, principally argues that 
they strengthen the case for the appropriateness of religious 
arguments in the public square. Part III evaluates Wayne Barnes’s 
contention that Christian doctrine requires separating religion 
from politics. 
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I. Introduction 
In the opening piece of this roundtable, I argue that Jefferson, 
Lincoln, and the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., demonstrate 
that the concept of separating church and state was never intended 
to separate religion from politics.1 I’m very appreciative of the 
three learned scholars who’ve responded to my argument. I view 
Professor David Smolin’s and Ian Huyett’s contributions as 
basically agreeing with, in fact strengthening, my position.  
Professor Wayne Barnes, on the other hand, while agreeing that 
the Constitution doesn’t prohibit political activity by Christians, 
argues that Christianity itself creates constraints on believers’ 
actions in the public square. 
In Part II, I comment on Smolin’s and Huyett’s responses. Part 
III focuses principally on Barnes’s argument that Christian 
doctrine, properly understood, restricts political activity by 
believers. This Part was particularly interesting to write because I 
                                                                                                     
 1. Samuel W. Calhoun, Separation of Church and State: Jefferson, Lincoln, 
and the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., Show It Was Never Intended To 
Separate Religion From Politics, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 459 (2018). 
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once held a view similar to the one Barnes now holds.2 I thus was 
faced with refuting arguments that at one time I found convincing. 
II. Smolin and Huyett Strengthen the Case for the 
Appropriateness of Religious Arguments in the Public Square 
Professor Smolin has long ably defended “the rights to full and 
equal political participation by evangelical Christians, 
traditionalist Roman Catholics, and any others who would be 
restricted”3 by proffered exclusionary criteria such as “public 
accessibility, public reason, or secular rationale.”4 Ian Huyett’s 
piece is his debut in this longstanding debate.5 He explains his 
“general agreement” with my position,6 persuasively arguing that 
the Christian worldview, meriting “intellectual regard,” can’t 
justifiably be barred from “speaking . . . to public policy.”7 
My argument for the permissibility of religious perspectives in 
public discourse has three components: (1) the Founders didn’t 
intend to separate religion from politics;8 (2) religion and politics 
                                                                                                     
 2. Samuel W. Calhoun, Conviction Without Imposition: A Response to 
Professor Greenawalt, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 289 (1992). My former position actually 
placed more restrictions on Christians’ political activity than does Barnes’s 
approach.  See infra notes 127–129 and accompanying text.   
 3. See David M. Smolin, America’s Creed: The Inevitable, Sometimes 
Dangerous, Mixing of Religion and Politics, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 512, 
513 & n.4 (2018). 
 4. Id. at 513. Smolin, an evangelical Christian when he began advocating 
for inclusion, is now a Roman Catholic. Id. at 513 n.3. He is “not yet prepared to 
take up the mantle of representing Catholic perspectives on politics,” id., but he 
still refutes the view that “an overarching, purportedly secular theory of politics 
should be exclusionary toward religion.” Id. at 514 n.5. 
 5. Ian Huyett, Church History, Liberty, and Political Morality: A Response 
to Professor Calhoun, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 546 (2018). I know Huyett 
is a Christian, see id. at 546, from our personal interaction at Washington and 
Lee. He wrote an independent research paper for me during his final year of law 
school, which in part led to Ian Huyett, “As I Had Mercy on You”: Karla Faye 
Tucker, Immanuel Kant, and the Impossibility of Christian Retributivism, 1 
RELIGIO ET LEX 15 (Summer 2018).        
 6. Huyett, supra note 5, at 546.   
 7. Id. at 564. “[M]y [own] defense of the appropriateness of religious values 
in public life isn’t limited to one religion.” Calhoun, supra note 1, at 462. Huyett, 
however, narrows his focus to Christianity. Huyett, supra note 5, at 546.  
 8. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 465–70. 
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have been continuously intermixed since the Founding;9 and (3) no 
other reasons justify barring religious arguments from the public 
square.10 Neither Smolin nor Huyett addresses my first argument. 
They do, however, both agree that religion and politics have always 
been intermixed in American life.11 Using the example of 
“contemporary presidential politics,” Smolin asserts that “religious 
influence is ubiquitous” on both the political left and right12—
indeed, “finding examples of religious motivation and rhetoric in 
politics is a bit like finding samples of salt water in the Pacific 
Ocean.”13 This “widespread” practice leads Smolin rightly to 
question the persistence of “academic discourse on the legitimacy 
of religious rhetoric and reasoning in politics.”14 “What needs 
explanation and correction . . . is not religion in politics, but 
academic theories that claim to speak for democratic liberalism 
and yet are illiberal in their exclusions of religious motivation and 
reasoning.”15 Smolin and Huyett together offer cogent criticism of 
the exclusionist position. From their numerous arguments, I’ll 
briefly focus on five: (1) exclusionists seek a clear path for 
advancing their own policy objectives; (2) exclusionists ask the 
impossible of religious believers; (3) exclusionists ignore their own 
“faiths”; (4) exclusionists ignore the societal threat their position 
poses; and (5) fears of theocracy are a red herring. 
                                                                                                     
 9. Id. at 471–80. 
 10. Id. at 480–86. 
 11. Huyett, supra note 5, at 546–47; Smolin, supra note 3, at 516.        
 12. Smolin, supra note 3, at 517.  
 13. Id.   
 14. Id. at 518. Smolin observes that educational institutions’ commitment to 
a diverse community generally doesn’t “include political, ideological or religious 
diversity, even though such forms of viewpoint diversity would seem particularly 
relevant in an educational context.” Id. at 524. “[C]reating a self-reinforcing 
academic discourse of exclusion [thus] brings . . . [the academy’s] own mission 
into question.” Id. at 545.       
 15. Id; see also Calhoun, supra note 1, at 485–86 (arguing that squelching 
religious arguments belies a purported commitment to diversity).             
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A. The Weaknesses of Exclusionism 
1. Exclusionists Seek a Clear Path for Advancing Their Own 
Policy Objectives 
Huyett asserts that secularists’ own moral premises inform 
their politics.16 If those premises clash with some held by religious 
citizens, what course should our society pursue? In a democracy, 
one might suppose the answer is public debate. After open 
discussion, find out which view prevails. But what if you fear losing 
the debate? Smolin believes this is precisely the posture of 
academic exclusionists, who fear the political success of religious 
conservatives “on certain culturally sensitive issues.”17 How then 
to improve one’s chance of winning? What better strategy than 
gagging your opponents by declaring them illegitimate 
participants in a policy debate?18 
For those who might discount Huyett’s, Smolin’s, and my 
labeling exclusionism as unfair advocacy—the thought being that 
we’re just three Christians grasping at straws to avoid a personally 
disagreeable outcome—it’s instructive to consider Professor Noah 
Feldman’s views. Feldman, not a Christian,19 observes that 
secularists, “[b]ecause their own bedrock beliefs tend to be based 
on nonreligious propositions . . . are in practice suspiciously 
unaffected by a rule that political argument must not be 
religious.”20 He concludes that our society should “be more tolerant 
                                                                                                     
 16. See Huyett, supra note 5, at 559–60. 
 17. Smolin, supra note 3, at 542. 
 18. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 485.  
When [evangelicals] try to make religious values the touchstone for 
debate, legal secularists tend to respond not by disagreeing with their 
values but by dismissively telling them that those values have no place 
in the public conversation—in other words, by telling them they are 
breaking the rules of good citizenship. 
NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND WHAT 
WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 243–44 (2005).      
 19. He was “[r]aised and educated in a Modern Orthodox Jewish milieu.” 
FELDMAN, supra note 18, at 16. Although disclosing that he hasn’t “always 
remained squarely within the normative grounds of traditional Judaism” and 
that he has also “studied and written about Islam,” id. at 17, Feldman apparently 
still adhered to the Jewish faith when he wrote his book.      
 20. Id. at 225. This quote makes clear that Feldman recognizes that 
secularists are motivated by their own values. It’s therefore unfortunate that he, 
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of sincere religious people[’s] drawing on their beliefs and practices 
to inform their choices in the public realm.”21  
2. Exclusionists Ask the Impossible of Religious Believers 
Huyett argues that asking religious believers not to derive 
political conclusions from their beliefs is “nonsense. It is not 
logically possible to sincerely hold a belief while mentally 
cordoning it off from the rest of one’s mind.”22 To say “that ‘religion 
has no place in politics’ . . . is [to] demand that religious people 
adopt a sort of compulsory schizophrenia.”23 Jon Meacham agrees: 
“To believe something creates an obligation to make that belief 
known and to act upon it within the arena.”24  
But, as Feldman observes, if believers decide to participate in 
public policy debate, exclusionists demand that they “leave out the 
religious basis for their most fundamental beliefs.”25 Feldman 
asks, though, “[w]hy would anyone wish to debate crucially 
important subjects without the benefit of his foundational 
commitments?”26 Exclusionists thus would cut believers “off at the 
knees, crippling their ability to participate fully.”27  
3. Exclusionists Ignore Their Own “Faiths” 
                                                                                                     
in explaining his book as an attempt to promote reconciliation between “warring 
factions” in the church-state debate, id. at 16, names the two factions “values 
evangelicals” and “legal secularists.” Id. at 7–8. These two labels misleadingly 
suggest that only evangelicals are values-driven.         
 21. Id. at 248; see id. at 16, 251. Feldman clearly practices what he preaches. 
See Noah Feldman, The Pope’s Death Penalty Message Is for a Small Audience, 
BLOOMBERG, (Aug, 2, 2018, 2:55 PM) https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/ 
articles/2018-08-02/pope-francis-s-death-penalty-message-is-for-supreme-court (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2018) (commenting favorably on the Pope’s declaring the death 
penalty immoral under all circumstances) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 22. Huyett, supra note 5, at 558. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 485.   
 23. Huyett, supra note 5, at 558. 
 24. JON MEACHAM, THE SOUL OF AMERICA: THE BATTLE FOR OUR BETTER 
ANGELS 266 (2018). 
 25. FELDMAN, supra note 18, at 225. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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How clearly can secular philosophies be distinguished from 
religious faith? Smolin argues that the former “increasingly tak[e] 
the form and function of religion, with their own dogmas, vision of 
good and evil, and narrative of origins and ends.”28 Marxism, for 
example, “has been plausibly labeled a secular religion.”29 All “is 
justified in the name of such [an] ideolog[y] because [it] admits no 
ethical or religious system or higher power to which [it is] 
accountable. Any means is permissible under the actual practice of 
such [an] ideolog[y] because the ends are imperative and must be 
achieved by human actions.”30  
But totalitarian systems perhaps aren’t the only “faith-based” 
secular ideologies. Lance Morrow argues that “21st century 
progressivism is also a religion—a militant faith, a true church in 
nearly all important respects. It is a community of belief and 
shared values, with dogmas, heresies, sacraments and fanatics; 
with saints it reveres and devils it abhors . . . .”31 Jillian Kay 
                                                                                                     
 28. Smolin, supra note 3, at 521; see id. at 532–33. Andrew Sullivan argues 
that it’s “impossible not to have a religion if you are a human being. It’s in our 
genes and has expressed itself in every culture, in every age, including our own 
secularized husk of a society.” Andrew Sullivan, America’s New Religions, N.Y. 
MAG. (Dec. 7, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/12/andrew-sullivan-
americas-new-religions.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Sullivan defines religion as “a way of life that 
gives meaning, a meaning that cannot really be defended without recourse to 
some transcendent value, undying ‘Truth’ or God (or gods).” Id. Based on this 
definition, Sullivan posits that “even today’s atheists are expressing an 
attenuated form of religion. Their denial of any God is as absolute as others’ faith 
in God, and entails just as much a set of values to live by—including, for some, 
daily rituals like meditation, a form of prayer.” Id. 
 29. Smolin, supra note 3, at 521. Huyett persuasively refutes the charge that 
“Marxism is an illegitimate child of the Christian faith.” See Huyett, supra note 
5, at 555–57.   
 30. Smolin, supra note 3, at 533.    
 31. Lance Morrow, A Spectral Witness Materializes, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 
2018, 7:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-spectral-witness-materializes-
1537225498 (last visited Dec. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). According to one scholar, secular humanism is also a religion: 
[R]eligion is defined . . . as the beliefs about the source and content of 
the rules of conduct that govern human behavior . . . . Because this 
definition is not contingent on a continued belief that the source of 
those rules is divine, it follows that all moral convictions are properly 
classified as religious convictions . . . . Like other religions, secular 
humanism constitutes a humanly authored system of beliefs about the 
source of legal authority and the principles that should determine the 
content of the law.   
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Melchior suggests the same thing about the “intersectional 
feminism” of bell hooks.32 If these secular philosophies are indeed 
“faiths,” logic would require that exclusionism also bar them from 
public discourse.  
4. Exclusionists Ignore the Societal Threat Their Position Poses 
Smolin contends that “isolating and marginalizing [religious 
citizens] outside of the peaceful processes of dialogue, debate, 
speech, and politics heighten[]” the risk of societal unrest.33 Those 
who lose in a spirited, but fair, political fight are more inclined to 
acquiesce in the outcome than those barred from participating.34  
Feldman agrees that exclusionists, by stifling full and open 
political involvement by religious citizens, could unwittingly 
motivate them to “demand a change to the rules of the game.”35 
                                                                                                     
Nomi M. Stolzenberg, From Eternity to Here: Divine Accommodation and the Lost 
Language of Law, USC GOULD SCHOOL OF LAW: CTR. FOR L. & SOC. SCI., Legal 
Studies Research Papers Series No. 18-28 (Sept. 25, 2018).  
 32. See Jillian Kay Melchior, A Prophet for the ‘Social Justice’ Movement, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2018, 6:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-prophet-for-
the-social-justice-movement-1537481416?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=1 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
[B]ell hooks was 
[b]orn Gloria Jean Watkins in 1952, Ms. Hooks uses a lowercase pen 
name “to focus attention on her message rather than 
herself,” . . . . That message begins with “intersectionality” theory—
the claim that racism, sexism and similar types of oppression 
compound each other’s effects—and advises social-justice warriors (or 
SJWs) on how to respond. 
Id.  
 33. Smolin, supra note 3, at 542. “It is a part of the genius of American 
democracy to productively channel political divisions and conflicting interests 
through inclusion and participation in a societal marketplace of ideas.” Id. 
Smolin, though, also acknowledges that religion itself can stimulate societal 
unrest if “it becomes intertwined with an ethnic or nationalistic identity, and the 
accompanying faith, ethics, or teachings are weaker than the merged 
religious-ethnic/nationalistic identity.” Id. at 538.            
 34. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 486 n.162. 
 35. FELDMAN, supra note 18, at 225. Smolin posits evangelicals’ major 
support for Donald Trump, whom Smolin didn’t vote for and whose Presidency he 
finds “destabilizing and offensive,” as another consequence of pushing them “to 
the margins of society and delegitimiz[ing] their participation in political, public, 
and economic life.” Smolin, supra note 3, at 530. If you so treat a group, “you 
cannot expect their votes nor control to whom they go for assistance.” Id. For an 
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5. Fears of Theocracy Are a Red Herring 
Katherine Stewart, a frequent New York Times contributor, 
greatly exaggerates the dangers of what she calls Christian 
Nationalism. In a 2012 book, she describes Christian Nationalists 
as those seeking to achieve “Christian control of all the important 
parts of government and society.”36 If the meaning of “control” is 
somewhat vague in this quotation, elsewhere she’s clearer—
American Christian Nationalists can be equated with 
fundamentalists “elsewhere in the world” who seek to make “their 
state a theocracy.”37 Stewart doesn’t claim that all conservative 
Christians are Christian Nationalists,38 but she nonetheless is 
very distressed by a movement she believes is trying “to undermine 
the foundations of modern secular democracy.”39 She calls on 
Americans to rise up in defense before “it’s too late.”40   
In this brief Essay, it’s difficult to fully engage Stewart’s 
alarmist view.41 Smolin acknowledges the existence of a Christian 
theocratic position, but states that it’s “a tiny group and hence of 
little political significance.”42 He also makes clear that the future 
                                                                                                     
insightful argument for the importance of distinguishing between political 
evangelicals, i.e., those whom pollsters emphasize, and the larger group of 
theological evangelicals, i.e., those defined by “a core set of beliefs,” see Timothy 
Keller, Can Evangelicalism Survive Donald Trump and Roy Moore?, NEW YORKER 
(Dec. 19, 2017) https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/can-evangelicalism-
survive-donald-trump-and-roy-moore (last visited Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 36. KATHERINE STEWART, THE GOOD NEWS CLUB: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT’S 
STEALTH ASSAULT ON AMERICA’S CHILDREN 3 (2012).   
 37. Id. at 259. 
 38. Id. at 3. I’m one example of a conservative non-Nationalist Christian. See 
infra notes 121–123 and accompanying text.   
 39. STEWART, supra note 36, at 7. 
 40. See id. at x, 259. For an earlier book on the perceived dangers of 
Christian Nationalism, see MICHELLE GOLDBERG, KINGDOM COMING: THE RISE OF 
CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM (2006).  
 41. I believe that Professor Noah Feldman would agree that Stewart 
overstates the risks of theocracy. He emphasizes the significance of American 
religious diversity during the Founding Era. See infra note 73. Today, the United 
States is much more religiously diverse due to “the increasing presence of other 
non-Christian religious minorities.” FELDMAN, supra note 18, at 241.   
 42. Smolin, supra note 3, at 540. In particular, Christian Reconstructionism, 
which Stewart calls “the most austere and intellectually rigorous form of 
Dominionism [“the idea that Christians should seek to dominate all aspects of 
secular politics and society until the return of Christ,” STEWART, supra note 36, at 
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for religion he envisions isn’t “state-supported religious 
institutions,” but instead competition “for its very survival” in “a 
marketplace of religious, philosophical, political and social 
ideas.”43 Stewart herself elsewhere uses the term “Christian 
nationalist” to describe political activity that can’t plausibly be 
labeled “theocratic,” e.g., pastors attempting “to mobilize 
congregations to vote according to what they see as their biblical 
values.”44 During the Civil Rights Movement, didn’t Martin Luther 
King seek laws that reflected biblical values?45 And what about the 
evangelical pastors and leaders who recently expressed “support 
for ‘just, compassionate and welcoming policies toward refugees 
and other immigrants’”?46 Were King and the evangelicals 
Christian Nationalists too? Would Stewart criticize them for 
seeking a theocracy? 
Stewart in fact is yet another exclusionist who doesn’t like 
competing with values differing from hers. She makes this explicit: 
“It would be a much nicer world if we could simply allow one 
another to carry on in our personal [religious] beliefs and approach 
policy questions . . . without regard to that private world.”47 But 
                                                                                                     
108–09], STEWART, id. at 109, Smolin characterizes as “a vanishingly small 
proportion of Christianity . . . [that] lacks much in the way of denominational or 
institutional structure.” Smolin, supra at 540 n.108. 
 43. Smolin, supra note 3, at 545. 
 44. Katherine Stewart, The Christian Right Adopts a 50-State Strategy, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 20, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/opinion/christian-
right-evangelicals-midterms.html (last updated June 27, 2018) (last visited Dec. 
19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). One wonders if 
Stewart would also criticize the efforts of Muslim and Jewish religious leaders to 
encourage voting by their congregations. See Deborah Barfield Berry, Midterms 
2018: Faith leaders try creative steps to urge people to vote. ‘It is an act of worship’,  
USA TODAY (Nov. 2, 2018, 6:32 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
news/politics/elections/2018/11/02/election-day-2018-faith-leaders-take-pulpit-
get-flocks-vote/1823233002/ (last updated Nov. 2, 2018, 1:21 PM) (last visited Dec. 
19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 45. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 480–81. 
 46. Id. at 487–88. And what would Stewart say about United Methodist 
Pastor Will Green, who in late October 2018 publicly interrupted then-Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions with an admonition about immigration policy based on 
Matthew 25:42-43? Shane Ryan, “I Was Hungry and You Did Not Feed Me”: 
Methodist Pastor Confronts Jeff Sessions, PASTE (Oct. 30, 2018, 11:05 AM), 
https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2018/10/i-was-hungry-and-you-did-not-
feed-me-methodist-lea.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).       
 47. STEWART, supra note 36, at xi. By this quote, Stewart also demonstrates 
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policy questions must be approached from some values 
perspective. Stewart, by stoking fears of theocracy, works 
zealously to delegitimize religious values, thus clearing the path 
for her own secular principles. 
Although I’m in complete accord with Huyett’s and Smolin’s 
anti-exclusionist arguments, some aspects of their papers raise 
questions for me, and in a few instances, disagreement.  
B. Questions/Disagreement 
1. Huyett 
Huyett argues that because “[n]o secular account of political 
morality . . . can provide premises which are more tenable than 
theistic ones,”48 “secularists are no more justified in using their 
own moral premises in policy arguments than are religious 
believers.”49 I believe that Huyett’s actual position is stronger than 
he states. I posit that he, like I, believes that God offers the only 
solid grounding for moral precepts—all secular foundations of 
morality ultimately fail.50 I disagree, however, with Huyett’s 
suggestion that a God-based system resolves all difficulties in 
grounding moral duties.51 I also don’t understand Huyett’s 
                                                                                                     
she’s quite willing to subject religious citizens to the “compulsory schizophrenia” 
that Huyett finds objectionable. See supra text accompanying note 23.   
 48. Huyett, supra note 5, at 560. 
 49. Id. 
 50. For evidence demonstrating that Huyett would agree, see his criticism of 
both nihilism, id. at 560–62, and of Platonic atheism. Id. at 562–63; see also id. at 
564. For my views, see Samuel W. Calhoun, Grounding Normative Assertions: 
Arthur Leff’s Still Irrefutable, But Incomplete, “Sez Who?” Critique, 20 J.L. & 
RELIGION 31 (2004–05).   
 51. See Huyett, supra note 5, at 563–64. Although only God can firmly 
ground normative claims, Calhoun, supra note 50, at 34–38, difficulties remain:  
All God-grounded truth claims rest upon three critical presuppositions. 
Each must be valid if God is to be of any help in grounding conceptions 
of “the right.” The first is that there really is a God. The second is that 
the God one looks to is the God who actually exists. The third is that 
this true God communicates knowledge concerning “the right” in 
incontestable ways.  
Id. at 61 (citations omitted). Consequently, no “Christians, or those of any faith, 
should expect their religious arguments to convince, on religious grounds, even 
their fellow believers, much less people of other faiths or the non-religious.”  
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characterizing exclusionism by atheists as “extravagant 
dishonesty.”52 Huyett argues that if atheists believe that all 
religious beliefs are false, they should say so explicitly instead of 
“obscur[ing] their true position” by supporting a “wall of 
separation.”53 But might not an atheist in good faith believe 
(wrongly, I assert) that religious beliefs, true or not, shouldn’t 
inform public policy due to existing constitutional constraints?  
Finally, I’m not sure what Huyett means in saying that because 
atheism is a false belief, it shouldn’t “inform public policy.”54 I 
expect not, but this language suggests that Huyett would erect his 
own wall of separation. If so, he could rightly be accused of reverse 
exclusionism. 
Huyett devotes a substantial portion of his response to 
demonstrating that worldwide, “for thousands of years, Christians 
have advanced human liberty through the explicit application of 
their faith to politics and law.”55 This history isn’t directly relevant 
to evaluating whether separation of church and state was meant 
to separate religion from politics in the United States.56  
Nonetheless, Huyett’s argument provides extra-territorial support 
for a sub-theme of my article—that, in the United States, believers’ 
open reliance upon their faith on public policy questions has been 
broadly beneficial.57 Huyett strengthens this conclusion with his 
                                                                                                     
Samuel W. Calhoun, May the President Appropriately Invoke God? Evaluating the 
Embryonic Stem Cell Vetoes, 10 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION ONLINE 1, 5–6 (2009).      
 52. Huyett, supra note 5, at 559. 
 53. Id. at 558–59. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 547–48. Among his examples are “the Dominicans—who were the 
foremost critics of Spanish atrocities against American Indians.” Id. at 553.  
Huyett relates that some scholars have attempted to de-Christianize a principal 
Dominican reformer, Bartolomé de las Casas, by “detach[ing] him from church 
history and reimagin[ing] him as a secular Enlightenment thinker.” Id. at 553–
54. This is reminiscent of the effort by some to downplay the Christian faith of 
the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 481 n.133. 
 56. On the other hand, American history showing the continuous mixing of 
religion and politics is directly relevant to accurately understanding the meaning 
of separation of church and state. 
 57. My examples include Lincoln’s opposition to slavery, Calhoun, supra 
note 1, at text accompanying notes 116–19, and Martin Luther King’s leadership 
of the Civil Rights Movement. Id. at notes 127–32 & accompanying text. 
Christianity’s beneficial impact is much broader. For example, Andrew Sullivan 
describes its essential role in the development of liberal democracy itself, “as 
many earlier liberals (Tocqueville, for example) understood.” Sullivan, supra note 
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own contemporary American example of openly Christian political 
activism, i.e., Charles Colson’s efforts to reform criminal justice.58 
Huyett’s ancient and modern examples support his assertion “that 
Christianity has had a broadly constructive influence on Western 
politics.”59 He later makes an even stronger claim: “[No] force in 
history [has] exercised so beneficial an influence on public policy 
as Christianity.”60 Although there is indeed powerful evidence of 
Christianity’s overall positive impact on world affairs,61 it must 
not be forgotten that Christians unfortunately have sometimes 
supported causes that virtually all Christians now agree were 
morally wrong, e.g., the pro-slavery stance in the Civil War era.  
2. Smolin 
My Article relies upon the Declaration of Independence as 
evidence that Thomas Jefferson “never intended to insulate 
politics from religion.”62 Smolin relies upon it as the source of “a 
political creed that creates a specific relationship between religion 
and politics”—that “[r]eligion . . . defines the proper purposes and 
limits of politics.”63 This particular relationship is established by 
the Declaration’s most famous words,64 which proclaim that 
                                                                                                     
28. 
It is Christianity that came to champion the individual conscience 
against the collective, which paved the way for individual rights. It is 
in Christianity that the seeds of Western religious toleration were first 
sown. Christianity is the only monotheism that seeks no sway over 
Caesar, that is content with the ultimate truth over the immediate 
satisfaction of power. It was Christianity that gave us successive social 
movements, which enabled more people to be included in the liberal 
project, thus renewing it. It was on these foundations that liberalism 
was built, and it is by these foundations it has endured. 
Id. 
 58. Huyett, supra note 5, at 554–55. 
 59. Id. at 557. 
 60. Id. at 564. 
 61. See generally JEREMIAH J. JOHNSTON, UNIMAGINABLE: WHAT OUR WORLD 
WOULD BE LIKE WITHOUT CHRISTIANITY (2017); D. JAMES KENNEDY & JERRY 
NEWCOMBE, WHAT IF JESUS HAD NEVER BEEN BORN? (1994).   
 62. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 468–69.   
 63. Smolin, supra note 3, at 543. 
 64. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold 
these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are 
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“[h]umanity is endowed by our Creator with rights and equality, 
and the purpose of government is to secure those rights.”65       
I completely agree with Smolin thus far.66 But I disagree with 
his interpreting the Declaration’s “reference to God as an 
invitation to include whoever or whatever is understood as highest 
and holy.”67 This view strikes me as unpersuasive both historically 
and logically. Smolin relies upon Jefferson’s primary authorship.68  
But Jefferson didn’t have in mind some amorphous notion of the 
good. Instead, he envisioned an intervening God, whose wrath on 
account of slavery Jefferson feared.69   
Smolin’s interpretation is also logically flawed. The “political 
creed” that the Declaration established is convincing only if what 
the Declaration declares is actually true, i.e., that a Creator really 
did endow mankind with inalienable rights.70 No firm grounding 
                                                                                                     
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . . . That to secure 
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men . . . .”).  
 65. Smolin, supra note 3, at 543. 
 66. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 468. 
 67. Smolin, supra note 3, at 544. 
 68. See id. at 543–44. 
 69. “Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just: that his 
justice cannot sleep forever . . . .” THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF 
VIRGINIA 163 (William Peden ed., 1955) (1787); see Calhoun, supra note 1, at 470.  
Jefferson’s concern about God’s possible intervention in itself shows that Smolin 
is incorrect to characterize Jefferson as a deist, see Smolin, supra note 3, at 544.  
In fairness, I should point out that this description of Jefferson is widespread. 
See, e.g., JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 259 (1997). 
 70. Smolin in effect asserts that Jefferson didn’t actually believe this, for he 
(Smolin) states that God was invoked to signal that the Declaration’s “view of 
politics” wasn’t “just an expediency in the shifting sands of changing political and 
social arrangements, but a permanent understanding of the foundations and 
purpose of politics, rooted in both whatever is highest and in our shared human 
nature.” Smolin, supra note 3, at 543. But Jefferson didn’t choose his language 
just to send the message Smolin describes. Jefferson chose it because he believed 
it: The “only firm basis” for “the liberties of a nation” is “a conviction in the minds 
of the people that these liberties are . . . the gift of God[.]” JEFFERSON, supra note 
69, at 163. Although this quote doesn’t explicitly declare this to be Jefferson’s own 
belief, the evidence is compelling that it was. In an 1817 letter, Jefferson stated 
that evidence of the natural rights of “life, liberty . . . [and the] pursuit of 
happiness, is not left to the feeble and sophistical investigations of reason but is 
impressed on the sense of every man. [W]e do not claim these under the Charter 
of kings or legislators; but under the king of kings.” Thomas Jefferson, Thomas 
Jefferson to John Manners, 12 June 1817 (June 12, 1817), NAT’L ARCHIVES: 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-11-02-
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for such rights can be found by asking, as Smolin does, “the ‘nones’ 
of our nation[,] who generally possess some kind of personal 
spirituality,” to read “their own view of divinity or whatever is of 
highest spiritual value into the Creator God of the text.”71 This is 
not to say that I disagree with Smolin’s ultimate conclusion that 
the Declaration, because it acknowledges “the rights and equality 
of all human beings . . . is broad enough to include those who do 
not accept it as a matter of belief.”72 But it was a complex mixture 
of factors, not the Declaration, that ensured “that politics would 
not try to enforce on the people a single religious vision.”73   
                                                                                                     
0360 (last visited Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). This perspective isn’t surprising—after all, the final Declaration draft 
that Jefferson submitted to Congress spoke of Creator-endowed rights. PAULINE 
MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 236 
(1997) (Congress’s substitution of “certain” for “inherent,” id., leaves God as the 
exclusive source of rights). Some, in what seems to be an attempt to mask 
Jefferson’s belief in rights’ divine origin, stress that his rough draft described 
Declaration-declared truths as “sacred and undeniable,” whereas the final draft 
presented to Congress substituted “self-evident.” See Casey N. Cep, True Lies: Jill 
Lepore excavates the history of America, down to its bedrock values, HARV. MAG., 
September–October 2018, at 64, 64–65. This change allegedly shows that “rights 
were no longer ‘the stuff of religion’ but ‘the stuff of science.’” Id. at 65. Allen 
Jayne, however, persuasively rebuts this interpretation: “The term ‘sacred’ would 
have been a redundancy if used to mean that rights were God-given; the 
statement that all men are equally ‘endowed by their Creator’ with ‘unalienable 
Rights’ carries this meaning of the word.” ALLEN JAYNE, JEFFERSON’S 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS, PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY 118–19 
(1998). 
 71. Smolin, supra note 3, at 544 (A “none” is someone who reports no 
religious affiliation. Becka Alper, Why America’s ‘Nones’ Don’t Identify with a 
Religion, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 8, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/08/08/why-americas-nones-dont-identify-with-a-religion/ (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)). There’s all the 
difference in the world between liberties grounded in a God who actually exists 
versus “whoever or whatever is understood as highest and holy.” See supra text 
accompanying note 67. 
 72. Smolin, supra note 3, at 544. 
 73. Id. Noah Feldman argues that “the politics of religious diversity” led the 
Framers “to agree on enacting the principle of the liberty of conscience by 
prohibiting a national establishment and protecting free exercise of religion.”  
FELDMAN, supra note 18, at 42; see also id. at 46. Feldman explains: 
The new form of government under consideration was intended to bind 
together the states into a union that was more complete—“more 
perfect”—than under the Articles of Confederation. The resulting 
bound-together union would contain a degree of religious diversity 
much greater than existed in any of the several states. Under these 
conditions, various religious groups worried about the possibility—
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Professor Smolin’s and my articles reveal a different 
emphasis. We focus on a different segment of the spectrum of what 
I’ve called exclusionists. At one extreme are those who may be 
deeply religious, but still believe good reasons exist for separating 
religion from politics.74 At the other extreme are those with deep 
hostility toward religion. My piece is more concerned with the 
former,75 whereas Smolin’s article emphasizes the latter.76 After 
memorably abridging the Dawkins-Harris-Hitchens stance—“If 
religion is a ‘delusion’ ‘that poisons everything,’ the best result is 
‘the end of faith’”77—Smolin asserts that for those with this 
perspective “separating religion from politics is part of a larger 
agenda of stigmatizing, isolating, and privatizing religion so that 
it may be safely relegated to the margins and then hopefully die 
out.”78 I don’t know which type of exclusionism predominates.  
Smolin, though, makes an important contribution by 
demonstrating that hostile exclusionists aren’t limited to a few 
virulent secularists like Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens.79 He 
                                                                                                     
unlikely to be sure—of the federal government coming under the 
control of some other particular denomination. This made them 
especially eager to prohibit this eventuality in constitutional terms. 
Id. at 43–44. But Madison believed that religious diversity itself, not the Bill of 
Rights, was most important: “[W]ithout religious diversity to ensure 
nonestablishment from the practical standpoint, a constitutional amendment 
would do no good, since it would be ignored by the majority.” Id. at 45.          
 74. Professor Barnes is one example, as I once was. See supra text 
accompanying note 2. 
 75. I don’t completely ignore those hostile to religion. My article, for example, 
charges Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and the late-Christopher Hitchens with 
launching “a rhetorical war of extermination against God.” Calhoun, supra note 
1, at 465 (quoting Calhoun, Embryonic Stem Cell Vetoes, supra note 51, at 6). But 
I also state that my interest in investigating the true meaning of separation of 
church and state was prompted by religious students who believe the doctrine 
prevents their using law to implement faith-based public policy goals. See 
Calhoun, supra note 1, at 460–61. And it’s not just students who feel this 
constraint on faith-based political action. A Christian professor once told me she 
refrained from bringing her personal pro-life views into the political realm due to 
the concept of separation of church and state.                             
 76. Smolin’s present piece focuses on hostile secularists. In an article 
published over twenty-five years ago, he responded to a religious exclusionist, i.e., 
me at that point in time. See David M. Smolin, The Enforcement of Natural Law 
by the State: A Response to Professor Calhoun, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 381 (1991). 
 77. Smolin, supra note 3, at 519. 
 78. Id.  
 79. If “virulent” seems an overstatement, consider how Dawkins’s, Harris’s, 
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stresses that “a significant number of scholars and academics most 
likely view certain prevalent religions in the United States as bad 
and harmful actors, and largely illegitimate participants in public 
life.”80 This belief in part explains “the political and legal theories 
claiming that political involvement by evangelical Christians, 
traditionalist Roman Catholics, and other such groups is 
illegitimate.”81 
Given that hostile exclusionism is widespread,82 it’s especially 
important that its weaknesses be exposed. As previously shown, 
                                                                                                     
and Hitchens’s opinions of God, expressed in their own words, would impact the 
Declaration of Independence:   
A “pernicious delusion,” not our “Creator,” made all men equal and 
gave them “unalienable Rights.” An “ancient man-made deit[y,]” not 
“Nature’s God,” is now the source of “the Laws of Nature.” The 
signatories no longer appeal to the “Supreme Judge of the World,” but 
to “the offal of the ancient world.” And the signatories, instead of 
relying upon “divine Providence,” now invoke “our 
prehistory . . . [failing to] to escape the gnarled hands which reach out 
to drag us back to the catacombs and the reeking altars and the guilty 
pleasures of subjection and abjection.”  
Calhoun, Embryonic Stem Cell Vetoes, supra note 51, at 7–8 (citations omitted). 
 80. Smolin, supra note 3, at 531.   
 81. Id.    
 82. Smolin gives other reasons for believers to be alarmed. “[A]cademic 
theories of political exclusion are part of a much larger set of messengers 
communicating to evangelicals, conservative Roman Catholics, and others that 
they will be excluded and marginalized if they adhere to their faith.” Id. at 528. 
One example Smolin mentions is Senator Bernie Sanders’s nomination hearing 
condemnation of Russell Vought, who nonetheless was confirmed as the Deputy 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget. See id. at 528–29 & 529 n.64. 
The startling thing about this incident is that Sanders declared Vought unfit for 
public office not because of his stance on some controversial public policy issue, 
but due to the unremarkable fact that he, a Christian, professed belief in 
Christianity’s core doctrine—the Gospel message, i.e., that the only way for sinful 
mankind to be restored to a relationship with a Holy God is an individual’s 
accepting by faith that Jesus Christ paid the penalty for one’s sin by dying on the 
Cross. See Emma Green, Bernie Sanders’s Religious Test for Christians in Public 
Office, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2017/06/bernie-sanders-chris-van-hollen-russell-vought/529614/ (last updated at June 
8, 2018, 11:40 AM) (last visited Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). For a powerful refutation of Senator Sanders’s conclusions, see 
Johnny Rex Buckles, Unashamed of the Gospel of Jesus Christ: On Public Policy 
and Public Service by Evangelicals, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 813 (2018). 
Buckles concludes by offering assurance to “evangelicals and other orthodox 
Christians considering whether to endure the possible spectacle of subjecting 
themselves to . . . antagonistic questioning.” Id. at 899. “[N]o legitimate public 
policy rationale disqualifies them from serving their country merely because of 
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Huyett and Smolin admirably do just that. Professor Barnes, 
though, an exclusionist principally due to devotion to his Christian 
faith, offers a different challenge to a critic of exclusionism. It’s to 
Barnes’s advocacy for exclusionism that I now turn. 
III. Does Christian Doctrine Require Separating Religion From 
Politics? 
Professor Wayne Barnes’s response differs dramatically from 
those of Huyett and Smolin. They basically agree with me that 
religious citizens should feel free to advocate on public policy issues 
with explicitly religious arguments.83 Barnes, an evangelical 
Christian himself,84 disagrees with respect to Christians. For 
theological reasons, he believes Christians shouldn’t make 
explicitly faith-based arguments in the public square. 
Barnes’s theological argument is his primary response to the 
third prong of my defense of religious arguments in public policy 
disputes, i.e., that “no other reasons justify barring faith-based 
arguments from the public square.”85 Before evaluating his stance, 
I’ll briefly address his comments on my first two assertions, i.e.,  
(1) “the Founders didn’t intend to separate religion from politics;”86 
and (2) “religion and politics have been continuously intermixed 
since the Founding.”87  
Regarding the “the Founders’ intent with respect to separation 
of religion and politics,”88 Professor Barnes rightly points out that 
the First Amendment restricts only “government behavior.”89  
Thus, he asserts, separation of church and state, even if accepted 
                                                                                                     
their faith-based commitments. Rather, they can face their inquisitors with full 
confidence in their theology of love and hope for all of humanity . . . .” Id.      
 83. Whether actually to use openly religious arguments in a particular 
situation calls for the exercise of prudent political judgment. See Calhoun, supra 
note 1, at 483 n.150. 
 84. See e.g., Wayne R. Barnes, Render Unto Rawls: Law, Gospel, and the 
Evangelical Fallacy, 24 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 235, 237, 243–44 (2013). 
 85. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
 86. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
 87. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
 88. Wayne R. Barnes, The Paradox of Christian-Based Political Advocacy: A 
Reply to Professor Calhoun, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 489, 491 (2018). 
 89. Id. at 494. 
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as capturing the Amendment’s meaning, “does not technically 
apply to individuals’ political argumentation at all.”90 I agree, but, 
based on personal experience, I know that the imagery of 
separation can constrain individuals’ political behavior even 
though that result is indefensible as a matter of constitutional 
law.91 Consequently, what Jefferson meant by his metaphor 
remains an important question.92 
Barnes “fully agree[s]” that religion and politics have been 
continuously mixed in American life.93 He also provides a useful 
catalog of contemporary examples from both conservative94 and 
liberal “Christian political activists.”95 Although embracing “this 
reality”—“intermixing of religion and politics . . . has happened 
throughout history, continues to happen, and will likely go on 
happening, regardless of what is said here”96—Barnes opposes 
such intermingling, in part due to “Rawlsian liberalism,” but 
mainly for Christian theological reasons.97 On these two grounds, 
he thus rejects my assertion that “no other reasons justify barring 
faith-based arguments from the public square.”98 I respectfully 
disagree with Barnes on both points.    
A. Rawlsian Liberalism Doesn’t Justify Exclusionism 
Professor Barnes still adheres to the Rawlsian critique of 
religious political discourse.99 Religious arguments are 
                                                                                                     
 90. Id.  
 91. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 460–61; supra note 75.  
 92. The evidence demonstrates that Jefferson’s “wall was meant to insulate 
religious belief and practices from legislative interference, not to separate religion 
from politics.” Calhoun, supra note 1, at 467 (citations omitted). Professor Noah 
Feldman agrees. See FELDMAN, supra note 18, at 38–40.  
 93. Barnes, supra note 88, at 491 (“the evidence is paramount”); see also id. 
at 495 (“How could one argue?”); id. at 503 (explicitly religious “political 
argumentation . . . [has been common] throughout our nation’s history”).  
 94. Id. at 497–500. 
 95. Id. at 500–03. 
 96. Id. at 491.  
 97. See id. at 492–93; Barnes, supra note 84, at 236–37, 243. 
 98. Id. at 491–92. 
 99. See id. at 505. 
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“inaccessible,”100 “much of the citizenry does not share [a] common 
religious viewpoint,”101 and religious worldviews aren’t “readily 
subject to compromise.”102 I’m not surprised that Professor Barnes 
was unmoved by my article’s brief critique of Rawls.103 Perhaps 
Professor Noah Feldman’s observations will be more convincing.  
Feldman challenges legal secularists who assert “that religion is a 
‘conversation stopper.’”104 He argues “that imagining religion to be 
the end of the political conversation represents a serious 
misunderstanding of the nature of religious belief, its capacity to 
change, and its relation to democratic politics.”105 Feldman 
describes many ways of engaging a religious believer in political 
dialogue.106 Consequently, “the notion that political debate must 
be secular in order to keep democratic deliberation going is 
misplaced.”107 
It’s significant to note that Barnes’s view is substantially more 
restrictive of Christian public advocacy than Rawls’s ultimate 
position. Rawls would allow religious arguments as long as they 
are supplemented within a reasonable time by non-religious 
ones.108 Barnes, however, would prohibit all “overt Christian 
political advocacy.”109 He thus “out-Rawls” Rawls. But Barnes’s 
more restrictive view doesn’t reflect disagreement with Rawls 
regarding what being a good citizen demands. Instead, Barnes 
emphasizes a theological defense of exclusionism. He asserts 
problems with explicitly Christian advocacy “from within 
                                                                                                     
 100. Id. at 491. 
 101. Id. at 492. 
 102. Id. at 505. 
 103. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 482–83. Rawlsism’s unfairness toward 
religious believers is also part of my critique. See supra notes 16–21 and 
accompanying text. For Professor Smolin’s criticism of Rawlsian and similar 
approaches, see Smolin, supra note 3, at 512–13 & 513 n.4. 
 104. FELDMAN, supra note 18, at 225.  
 105. Id. at 225–26. 
 106. See id. at 226–27. 
 107. Id. at 227. 
 108. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 482. I know from personal interaction with 
Professor Barnes that he’s aware of this facet of Rawlsism. It’s my understanding 
that Barnes omitted this point from his article due to space limitations.    
 109. Barnes, supra note 88, at 504. “Overtly Christian” means arguments “for 
law and public policy on the basis of explicit religious and Christian rationales.” Id. 
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Christian orthodoxy itself.”110 I once held a similar view, but I do 
no longer.  
B. Christian Doctrine Doesn’t Require Separating Religion From 
Politics 
I begin by expressing my sincere gratitude to Professor Barnes 
for his theological argument. It forces me to give a theological 
defense of my changed views, which I’ve previously explained 
largely in secular terms.111 Mainly, however, I appreciate Barnes’s 
love for and devotion to the Christian Gospel—“For God so loved 
the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes 
in him shall not perish but have eternal life.”112   
I too love the Gospel because it’s “the power of God that brings 
salvation to everyone who believes.”113 This fact makes it 
especially difficult for me to read the various ways Barnes 
describes the Gospel-obscuring impact of my current position: 
(1) “it miscommunicates the central Christian belief of how to 
obtain favor with God”;114 (2) it wrongly communicates “Christian 
doctrine”;115 (3) what I argue is “antithetical to Christian 
doctrine”;116 (4) public Christian political advocacy communicates 
“a false message about the central tenet and hope of Christian 
doctrine”;117 (5) my view presents “a tragically mistaken view of 
                                                                                                     
 110. Id. at 493. 
 111. See, e.g., Calhoun, Embryonic Stem Cell Vetoes, supra note 51. I have, 
however, previously expressed some religious objections to non-imposition. 
Calhoun, supra note 1, at 462 n.6. 
 112. John 3:16 (NIV); see supra note 82.   
 113. Romans 1:16. “Far from carrying any negative implications about God’s 
love for those outside the fold of the Christian faith, evangelical soteriology is 
founded on God’s love for people who have yet to embrace Christ the Savior.” 
Buckles, supra note 82, at 896–97. 
 114. Barnes, supra note 88, at 492. Because these theological reasons “are 
unique to Christianity,” they are also “unique to Christians invoking their beliefs 
for political argumentation.” Id. at 493. Barnes therefore has “nothing to say 
about legal arguments from other religious traditions.” Id. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 503. 
 117. Id. at 504. Barnes’s assertion explains the word, “paradox,” in his title: 
“well-meaning Christians like [Sam Calhoun]” make explicitly Christian political 
arguments, presumably in part motivated by the desire to advance Christianity, 
but, by so doing, they actually undermine the core Christian message. See id. at 
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Christianity”;118 (6) “Christian political advocacy is ‘at odds with 
the Gospel’”;119 and (7) such advocacy gives “the wrong message to 
the public about what Christianity has to say about obtaining favor 
with God.”120 Wow. Can my present view really be so 
Gospel-obscuring? If so, I would repudiate it at once. But I’m not 
convinced. 
To begin, it’s important to say that I agree with Professor 
Barnes that Jesus’ kingdom is not of this world.121 I therefore also 
agree that Christians’ “higher calling” is to share the Gospel, not 
seek “to impose a legislated morality of works via the secular 
state.”122 Rather than seeking political power, Christians’ first 
priority should be to bear witness to a fallen world of the love of 
God. We should strive to enhance the attractiveness of the Gospel 
by demonstrating God’s love ourselves. As we grow in 
Christ-likeness by applying biblical principles through the power 
of the Holy Spirit, we’re more and more able to emulate Jesus by 
loving others through acts of service and mercy.123 This doesn’t 
mean, however—and I think Barnes would agree—that Christians 
are prohibited from participating in public policy disputes. Our 
disagreement concerns the appropriateness of political advocacy 
that’s explicitly faith-based. He believes Christians should never 
use overt religious arguments, whereas I think an absolute 
prohibition is unwarranted.     
Professor Barnes’s core argument is that openly Christian 
political advocacy of godly conduct masks the Gospel truth that 
                                                                                                     
492. 
 118. Id. at 507.  
 119. Id. at 509 (quoting Samuel W. Calhoun, Misreading the Judeo-Christian 
Tradition and the Law: A Response to Professor Smolin, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
383, 398 (1990)). 
 120. Id. at 510. 
 121. Barnes, supra note 88, at 510 (citing John 18:36 (ESV)).   
 122. Id. 
 123. Christians won’t benefit society “unless we do believe Jesus died for us, 
unless we do believe that we live through the self-sacrifice of the great Jesus 
Christ, and therefore we’re going to live by self-sacrifice.” Tim Keller, Tim Keller’s 
Message to the UK Church: Stand Apart from Culture or Risk Being Ineffective, 
PREMIER CHRISTIANITY (June 20, 2018), https://www.premierchristianity. 
com/Blog/Tim-Keller-s-message-to-the-UK-Church-Stand-apart-from-culture-or-
risk-being-ineffective (last visited Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).   
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trusting Jesus Christ as Savior is the exclusive path for sinful man 
to be reconciled to a Holy God.124 A major obstacle I face in 
rebutting him is that I once said something very similar: 
The heart of the Christian message is that the only way to 
righteousness before God is through faith in Jesus Christ, who 
on the Cross paid the penalty for sin. Emphasis upon human 
law as the road to righteousness perpetuates a cruel delusion, 
like the story of Scrooge at Christmastime. Both direct people’s 
attention to their own conduct as the avenue to acceptability 
before God, when in truth acceptability lies only in trusting 
Jesus Christ as Savior.125   
Barnes, understandably, isn’t about to let me forget my past views.  
His response twice quotes my earlier position.126 He thus squarely 
(and fairly) confronts me with the unavoidable question—Why do 
I now believe that openly Christian political advocacy doesn’t 
undermine the Gospel? 
I’ll start by noting that my prior position imposed a greater 
constraint on Christians’ political activity than Barnes’s view. My 
“non-imposition principle” focused not on the rhetoric of political 
advocacy,127 but instead upon its underlying reasons—Christians 
should refrain from seeking laws implementing faith-based 
concepts unless secular reasons, standing alone, justified their 
support.128 Barnes, however, focuses exclusively on rhetoric. He 
doesn’t “advocate that Christians strip God and Christian beliefs 
from their private thinking about political and legal issues, but 
rather only from their public communications and advocacy of such 
issues.”129 Barnes is concerned about what’s expressed when 
                                                                                                     
 124. Barnes, supra note 88, at 492–93, 507–08, 509.  
 125. Calhoun, supra note 2, at 306 (in an earlier work, Barnes quoted this 
language in full. Barnes, supra note 84, at 262). To Christians, “[c]onduct is 
important, not as the avenue to God, but as the response of a grateful heart to 
God’s provision of the only way to Him—Jesus Christ.” Calhoun, supra at 306; see 
also Barnes, supra note 88, at 509 n.72. 
 126. Barnes, supra note 88, at 507, 509; see supra note 125. 
 127. My non-imposition article didn’t discuss the issue. Calhoun, supra note 
2, at 309 n.132.     
 128. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 462 n.6. 
 129. Barnes, supra note 88, at 507 n.64 (This quote makes clear that Barnes 
advocates only a linguistic separation between Christianity and politics. Given 
that his view allows Christians to ground their public policy positions in their 
faith, see also Barnes, supra note 84, at 168, some might contend that he’s not 
really an exclusionist at all.). I eventually found “abhorrent” that I once urged 
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Christians argue “that a certain law or public policy is needed 
because of some Christian principle[.]”130 The message “implicitly 
communicated” is that “if I behave according to the proposed 
‘Christian’ principles being advocated for, I will obtain greater 
favor with God.”131 It’s this message that so undermines the 
Christian Gospel.132  
Barnes’s position permits Christians not to disclose the true 
motivation for their political advocacy—Christian doctrine might 
be the real reason for a believer’s public policy positions, but any 
publicly expressed support for those views is restricted to secular 
terminology. For three reasons, I would’ve thought it better to be 
forthright about one’s reasons for taking a public stance. First, 
simple honesty dictates that one be transparent about one’s 
motivations.133 Second, in keeping silent about the true source of 
their moral views, Christians take personal credit for a stance 
when that credit properly belongs to God. Third, not mentioning 
Christian doctrine squanders the opportunity “to bear witness to 
the world of the reality of God.”134 Barnes, however, discourages 
religious terminology because he views it as undermining the 
                                                                                                     
Christians “to strip God from their thoughts” to apply my non-imposition 
principle. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 462 n.6.   
 130. Barnes, supra note 88, at 504; see also supra note 109 and accompanying 
text.  
 131. Barnes, supra note 88, at 506; see also id. at 509. 
 132. See supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text.   
 133. I’ve praised President George W. Bush for his transparency in expressing 
his faith during the embryonic stem cell veto controversy. Calhoun, Embryonic 
Stem Cell Vetoes, supra note 51, at 4 n.16.    
 134. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 463 n.11. 
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Gospel.135 The “central tenet and hope of Christian doctrine” must 
be preserved.136  
From past personal experience, I know that protecting the 
Gospel message is a powerful motivation. I proposed and advocated 
the non-imposition principle despite counterarguments much like 
the criticism that I now assert against exclusionism. For example, 
I defended my principle against assertions that Christians couldn’t 
distinguish between faith-based and secular reasoning;137 that it 
was wrong to demand that they even try to compartmentalize their 
lives;138 and that it was unfair to ask Christians to justify 
themselves on purely secular grounds when non-believers are 
allowed to rely upon their ultimate values in advocating on public 
policy issues.139 These criticisms didn’t sway me because I, like 
Barnes, believe that for Christians fidelity to the Gospel is a 
paramount value.140  
                                                                                                     
 135. See supra text accompanying notes 130–132. I ask Barnes to consider 
how his position might impact Christian pastors. Assume a pastor who wants to 
advocate regarding a public policy controversy. Mindful of Barnes’s concerns, the 
pastor makes no religious arguments. First, this silence would presumably strike 
most people as extraordinarily odd—“Surely the pastor must have some thoughts 
about how Christian teachings relate to the issue in dispute. How strange then 
that the pastor doesn’t communicate them.” Second, I don’t think the pastor’s 
total refraining from religious language would satisfy Barnes’s view of what’s 
needed to protect the Gospel. By definition, everyone knows the pastor is a 
Christian. If the pastor takes a position on a public dispute implicating justice, 
right and wrong, etc., everyone would automatically assume that the pastor 
considered the stance taken as consistent with Christian principles. 
Consequently, even the pastor’s totally eschewing religious rhetoric still involves 
the miscommunication that Barnes fears. The only apparent solution would be 
for the pastor never to take a public position on a controversial policy issue. And 
why wouldn’t such silence also be necessary for any citizen publicly known to be 
a Christian? See infra notes 162–164 and accompanying text.  
 136. Barnes, supra note 88, at 504. I also wonder how Barnes would handle 
the Declaration of Independence. I rely on the Declaration—which emphasizes 
Creator-endowed inalienable rights—as demonstrating that the Founders didn’t 
intend to separate religion from politics. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 468–69. But 
wouldn’t Barnes have to declare the Declaration’s most famous language off limits 
to Christians? I say this because, under his view, a Christian’s referring to it 
would risk peoples’ thinking that promoting life, liberty, and/or the pursuit of 
happiness would enhance their standing with the Creator.        
 137. Calhoun, supra note 2, at 309–15. 
 138. Id. at 315–16. 
 139. Id. at 317. 
 140. Keep in mind that my non-imposition principle is more restrictive of 
Christian advocacy than Barnes’s position. Supra notes 127–129 and 
590 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 565 (2019) 
This brings me back to the question I posed earlier—Why do I 
now believe that openly Christian political advocacy doesn’t 
undermine the Gospel? Huyett’s response is a good place to start.  
He relates Archbishop Ambrose’s denying communion to the 
Emperor Theodosius for ordering a brutal massacre.141 In 
explaining his actions, Ambrose said that “[h]aving heard of the 
massacre, he could not ‘close [his] ears with wax.’”142 Had he kept 
silent, his conscience would’ve made him “wretched.”143 Ambrose 
also relied upon Ezekiel 3:18: “If I [God] say to the wicked, ‘You 
shall surely die,’ and you give him no warning . . . that wicked 
person shall die for his iniquity, but his blood I will require at your 
hand.”144  
The Bible plainly teaches that God punishes both individual 
and corporate sin through devastating temporal consequences.145 
Jesus explicitly makes this point for individuals.146 Warning 
regarding corporate sin is provided by the “great flood in Noah’s 
day and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah in Abraham’s.”147 
                                                                                                     
accompanying text. From zeal to protect the Gospel, I nonetheless proposed and 
defended it.  
 141. Huyett, supra note 5, at 548. 
 142. Id. at 550. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. Hundreds of years later, Pope Gregory VII cited the same verse in 
excommunicating the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV for resisting “a push to end 
government control of internal church appointments.” Id. at 552. The Ezekiel 
passage speaks to failure to warn. God also holds us responsible for failure to 
rescue. See Proverbs 24: 11-12 (NIV).         
 145. Terrible circumstances don’t always reflect God’s punishment for sin. For 
example, the Scriptures teach that God uses hardship to help Christians mature 
in their faith. E.g., Hebrews 12:7-11 (NIV); James 1:2-4 (NIV). The Bible, however, 
is clear that nothing happens, good or bad, outside the sovereignty of God. E.g., 
Ecclesiastes 7:14 (NIV); Isaiah 45:7 (NIV); Lamentations 3:38 (NIV). 
 146. Luke 13:1-5. See also Lamentations 3:38-39 (NIV) (“Is it not from the 
mouth of the Most High that both calamities and good things come? Why should 
the living complain when punished for their sins?”).   
 147. Calhoun, supra note 2, at 306 (citations omitted). Another example is 
Israel’s taking possession of the Promised Land. The displaced nations were 
driven out “on account of [their] wickedness.” Deuteronomy 9:1-4 (NIV). Francis 
Schaeffer well describes how God’s judgment sometimes comes:  
I imagine myself holding a cup which has water dripping into it. The 
water does not come quickly, but I keep holding the cup. Gradually the 
water rises, and at a certain point it flows over the brim. This is the 
principle of the judgment of God: Man is in revolt against God, and God 
waits in longsuffering until every possibility of man’s turning back is 
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Each exemplifies “God’s judgment against mankind based upon 
conduct which was abhorrent to Him. Each shows that God in His 
evaluation of human societies does draw distinctions based upon 
conduct alone.”148 Jefferson’s fear of God’s wrath due to slavery 
demonstrates he believed this.149 And so did Abraham Lincoln, 
who believed the Civil War to be God’s judgment upon the nation 
for the sin of slavery. The Second Inaugural powerfully expresses 
this view,150 but Lincoln foreshadowed it over a year earlier, in his 
Proclamation Appointing a National Fast Day. In this March 31, 
1863 document, Lincoln acknowledges that Almighty God, “by His 
divine law,” subjects “nations like individuals . . . to punishments 
and chastisements in this world.”151 Consequently, “may we not 
justly fear that the awful calamity of civil war, which now desolates 
the land, may be but a punishment, inflicted upon us, for our 
presumptuous sins, to the needful end of our national reformation 
as a whole People?”152 Lincoln therefore designated “a day of 
national humiliation, fasting and prayer.”153 He closed by urging  
all the People . . . [to] rest humbly in the hope authorized by the 
Divine teachings, that the united cry of the Nation will be heard 
on high, and answered with blessings, no less than the pardon 
of our national sins, and the restoration of our now divided and 
suffering Country, to its former happy condition of unity and 
peace.154 
                                                                                                     
exhausted. When the iniquity is full, when the cup overflows, God’s 
judgment comes. 
FRANCIS A. SCHAEFFER, JOSHUA AND THE FLOW OF BIBLICAL HISTORY 66–67 (1976). 
For the concept of God’s waiting to judge until “iniquity is full,” see Genesis 15:16 
(NIV). 
 148. Calhoun, supra note 2, at 306 (citations omitted). At the time, this 
argument didn’t blunt my adherence to the non-imposition principle. Id. at 306–
07. 
 149. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 470. 
 150. See id. at 476–77. 
 151. Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation Appointing A National Fast Day (Mar. 
31, 1863), in VI THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 155–56 (Roy P. 
Basler ed., 1953). 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. 
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Given that Lincoln spoke of God’s “punishments and 
chastisements in this world,”155 I don’t think anyone would’ve 
viewed his proclamation as referring to one’s eternal salvation. 
Rather, the natural interpretation would’ve been that Lincoln was 
speaking of God’s interaction with humans in this life. By declaring 
the fast day, Lincoln wanted both to turn aside God’s negative 
intervention and to encourage His blessings right here on earth.   
The impact of Christian public advocacy should be viewed in 
the same way. Barnes fears a false message—that “if I behave 
according to the proposed ‘Christian’ principles being advocated 
for, I will obtain greater favor with God.”156 But even if this 
accurately describes peoples’ likely reaction, they’d almost 
certainly associate “greater favor” with earthly conditions, not 
their eternal destiny.157 So interpreted, Christian advocacy poses 
no threat to obscure the Gospel. 
I anticipate Barnes’s replying that, despite my argument, 
“greater favor” will most likely be associated with the afterlife.  
That’s, of course, possible.158 Even if so, however, it’s not certain 
that the message would be the destructive one Barnes fears, i.e., a 
person’s believing that improved behavior will get them into 
Heaven. The Bible teaches that one purpose of God’s moral law is 
to reveal sin: “Therefore no one will be declared righteous in God’s 
sight by the works of  the law; rather, through the law we become 
conscious of our sin.”159 This verse reveals the error in Barnes’s 
position. The passage begins by endorsing his stance that good 
behavior won’t restore one’s relationship with God. If Barnes’s 
                                                                                                     
 155. Id.  
 156. Barnes, supra note 88, at 506. 
 157. Given Barnes’s agreement with Rawls that religious arguments are 
“inaccessible,” id. at 491, it’s somewhat puzzling that he anticipates secular 
citizens’ giving any theological interpretation to explicitly Christian political 
advocacy. If, however, they should do so, I believe the interpretation I describe is 
more likely (although in my non-imposition days I agreed with Barnes). 
 158. Barnes and I both may be overly optimistic about the degree that secular 
citizens pay attention to religious arguments. Maybe the non-religious in effect 
close their ears to religious talk in the public square. This fear is a reason for 
believers to consider framing their policy arguments in secular terms. Calhoun, 
supra note 1, at 483 n.150. If, however, a secular citizen’s interest in Christianity 
were triggered by religious public arguments, isn’t it likely that person would end 
up talking to Christians and/or going to church? If so, correct information 
regarding what’s needed for personal salvation would hopefully then be conveyed. 
 159. Romans 3:20 (NIV). 
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view were correct, one would expect the verse next to admonish us 
to refrain from urging people to obey God’s law—from concern 
they’d be misled into thinking that good behavior was the route to 
God. Instead, the verse proclaims knowledge of the moral law as 
vital to making us aware of our sin.160 God’s moral law, then, 
rather than undermining the Gospel, is an indispensable 
component of that conviction of sin required for recognizing one’s 
need of a Savior.161 
I’d also ask Barnes to consider a final passage that I think 
casts doubt upon his position: “Live such good lives among the 
pagans that, though they accuse you of doing wrong, they may see 
your good deeds and glorify God on the day he visits us.”162 Why 
would God command us to live good lives before “pagans,” i.e., 
unbelievers, if doing so necessarily undermines the Gospel by 
miscommunicating the path to a restored relationship with Him?  
I’m sure that Barnes, like me, strives to live a life honoring to 
Christ.163 Non-Christians hopefully find things to admire in our 
behavior, perhaps even conduct to emulate. Are we both then 
miscommunicating the Gospel because our observers may 
                                                                                                     
 160. “Nevertheless, I would not have known what sin was had it not been for 
the law.” Romans 7:7 (NIV).   
 161. “So the law was put in charge to lead us to Christ that we might be 
justified by faith.” Galatians 3:24 (NIV). I realize there’s a major difference 
between Scriptures describing the role of God’s moral law in salvation and my 
argument that man’s law, promoted via overtly Christian arguments, could be 
used to convict others of their sin. For one thing, Christians, however 
well-intentioned, have no doubt sometimes advocated for laws that don’t reflect 
God’s will. In addition, how likely is it that advocating for even a godly law would 
actually convict another of sin? As a friend puts it, wouldn’t non-Christians more 
likely be annoyed by overt Christian political activity?—“Here’s somebody who 
has ‘straight from the mountain-top’ views about right and wrong who’s trying to 
force them down my throat by seizing the reins of power and adopting the morals 
and practices dictated by his religious beliefs into law for the whole nation.” 
E-mail from Professor David Eggert to Professor Samuel W. Calhoun (Nov. 16, 
2018) (on file with the Author). These are valid points, but the fact is that the 
Bible speaks plainly of a relationship between salvation and knowledge of God’s 
moral law. It’s thus a certainty, however unlikely it may seem, that God could use 
overtly Christian advocacy for a human law—assuming one that actually reflects 
His will—as part of a process to lead someone to faith in Christ. 
 162. 1 Peter 2:12 (NIV). 
 163. See Colossians 3:17 (NIV); 1 Peter 1:15; 4:11 (NIV); Romans 12:1 (NIV).  
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mistakenly assume that following our example is the way to please 
God?164 
Barnes’s devotion to the Gospel is highly commendable. But 
he pays insufficient attention to biblical calls to encourage godly 
behavior in non-believing individuals and nations. Doing so could 
forestall God’s temporal judgment on both and might also be used 
by God to show people their need of a Savior. Barnes, although 
motivated by compassion for others, is also too anxious that some 
misstep by Christians could ultimately thwart God’s saving 
mercy.165 As Jesus said,  
My sheep listen to my voice; I know them, and they follow me. I 
give them eternal life . . . no one can snatch them out of my 
hand. My Father, who has given them to me, is greater than all; 
no one can snatch them out of my Father’s hand.166  
God’s ultimate sovereignty regarding salvation doesn’t relieve 
Christians of the obligation and privilege of sharing the Gospel as 
He gives us the opportunity. But Christians’ responsibility to 
spread the Gospel doesn’t negate our freedom, if so guided by 
prudent political judgment, to openly appeal to Christian 
principles in public policy disputes.  
IV. Conclusion 
Participating in this roundtable has been an enjoyable, 
challenging, and personally meaningful experience. I once again 
                                                                                                     
 164. For those who observe us unseen, avoiding this risk seems impossible. 
For observers we know, wouldn’t avoiding it require our sharing the Gospel with 
everyone we meet? I know I don’t do so. If Barnes doesn’t either, wouldn’t such a 
failure reveal a major inconsistency between his personal life and his stance on 
openly religious arguments in the public square?    
 165. Barnes views any overtly Christian political advocacy as catastrophic, 
not merely mistaken. See supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text. As this 
piece makes clear, I now disagree with his categorical repudiation of such 
advocacy.  
 166. John 10:27-29 (NIV). This isn’t the place for a full discussion of Reformed 
Theology, which, relying upon multiple biblical passages, teaches that salvation 
is totally the work of God in a person’s heart. E.g., Ephesians 2:3-5 (NIV); John 
1:10-13 (NIV). Barnes is correct that to be saved an individual must accept Jesus 
by faith. Barnes, supra note 88, at 493, 508, 509. But Barnes is also right to say 
that faith itself “is the gift of God.” Id. at 508–09 (quoting Ephesians 2:8-9 (ESV)); 
see also John 6:44, 65. 
SEPARATING RELIGION FROM POLITICS 595 
thank my three respondents for their prior and future 
contributions.167 Rather than recapitulate all the arguments I’ve 
made, I instead will conclude with someone else’s thoughts that 
well express my present position regarding Christian participation 
in public policy disputes. 
Tim Keller is the founder and Pastor Emeritus of the 
Redeemer Presbyterian Churches of New York City. In June 2018, 
Keller addressed the Parliamentary Prayer Breakfast in London: 
“What Can Christianity Offer Our Society in the 21st Century?”168  
Keller’s focus was Jesus’ calling Christians to be “the salt of the 
earth.”169 “[I]n every society . . . [Christians] should be bringing 
out the best in that particular culture and preventing its worse 
tendencies . . . .”170   
Keller describes many instances of Christians’ “bringing out 
the best in Western society.”171 Christianity produced the societal 
transition from a “‘shame and honour’ culture, in which strength 
is the most important thing,” to an “other-regarding ethic of 
love.”172 One consequence was the concept of “human rights, the 
idea of every human being[’s] [having] equal dignity and worth.”173  
This changed perspective was exemplified by Gregory the Bishop 
of Nyssa, “the first person we know of, ever, that 
protested . . . [that] slavery is wrong per se . . . because human 
beings . . . are of infinite worth” as bearing the image of God.174 
                                                                                                     
 167. I’m embarrassed to admit how difficult I find acquiescing in their having 
the last word in this conversation. 
 168. Keller, supra note 123.  
 169. Id. (quoting Matthew 5:13). 
 170. Id. “Salt is only helpful to . . . meat if it’s not like the meat, if it’s itself.” 
Id. Likewise, to function as salt for society, Christians must “remain ‘salt,’ which 
is different from the rest of the culture.” Id. If British society wants the greatest 
benefit from Christians, it shouldn’t “demand that they become like everybody 
else. Our modern society says: we believe in respect for difference. Ok, respect 
Christians’ difference.” Id.   
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. Keller says it doesn’t matter whether one is personally a Christian or 
even believes in God. Id. “[Y]ou have been shaped by Christianity. Your moral 
sense is not the moral sense of an eastern or ancient ‘shame and honour’ culture, 
in which strength is the most important thing. You have an other-regarding, an 
ethic of love, and that came from Christianity.” Id. 
 173. Id. For more on Christianity’s critical role in the development and 
preservation of liberal democracy, see supra note 57.  
 174. Keller, supra note 123. 
596 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 565 (2019) 
Martin Luther King emphasized this very point—that mankind’s 
“uniqueness . . . worth . . . [and] dignity” are premised in bearing 
God’s image.175 Christianity also, in “the first sexual revolution,” 
transformed sexual ethics from a shame and honor approach to one 
that was “consensual and covenantal.”176 
To Keller, these past examples demonstrate that Christianity 
has “massively [been ‘salt’ regarding] the ideals that we all take 
for granted.”177 But what about now? Keller, in the New York 
Times, cautions Christians who would  
transcend politics and simply “preach the Gospel.” Those who 
avoid all political discussions and engagement are essentially 
casting a vote for the status quo. American churches in the early 
19th century that did not speak out against slavery because that 
was what we would now call “getting political” were actually 
supporting slavery . . . . Christians should be involved 
politically as a way of loving our neighbors, whether they 
believe as we do or not. To work for better public schools or for 
a justice system not weighted against the poor or to end racial 
segregation requires political engagement. Christians have 
done these things in the past and should continue to do so.178 
                                                                                                     
 175. Keller was referring to King’s sermon, “The American Dream,” which 
Keller said captured “perfectly” the requisite societal impact of recognizing 
mankind as God’s image-bearers. Id; see also Calhoun, supra note 1, at 478 n.119. 
In his sermon, King emphasized that there were “no gradations in the image of 
God. Every man . . . is significant . . . precisely because every man is made in the 
image of God . . . . This is why we must fight segregation with all of our nonviolent 
might . . . .” Martin Luther King, Jr., The American Dream, STAN. U.: THE MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR., RES. & EDUC. INST. (July 4, 1965), 
https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/american-
dreamsermon-delivered-ebenezer-baptist-church (last visited Dec. 19, 2018) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Although segregation is 
“inconvenient,” “sociologically untenable,” and “politically and economically 
unsound,” none of these are “what makes it wrong.” Id. “Ultimately, segregation 
is morally wrong and sinful.” Id.  
 176. Keller, supra note 123. In a shame and honor culture, sexual mores 
depended upon “the social order, the hierarchy . . . . So, if you were a man of high 
social status and you were married, you could have sex with who[m]ever you 
wanted. Your wife couldn’t. And no woman of lower social status would ever deny 
sex demanded by any man of a higher social status . . . .” Id. 
 177. Id. See supra note 57.  
 178. Timothy Keller, How Do Christians Fit Into the Two-Party System?  They 
Don’t, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/29/ 
opinion/sunday/christians-politics-belief.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). In his Parliamentary Prayer Breakfast Address, 
Keller says that Christians’ future role as salt “might be more of a way of 
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The church should “speak on social, economic and political 
realities . . . . Racism is a sin, violating the second of the two great 
commandments of Jesus, ‘to love your neighbor.’ The biblical 
commands to lift up the poor and to defend the rights of the 
oppressed are moral imperatives for believers.”179 Speaking “out 
against egregious violations of these moral requirements is not 
optional.”180 
Some might observe that Keller doesn’t explicitly address the 
rhetoric Christians should use when addressing moral wrongs. 
                                                                                                     
preventing decay, it might be more of a preservative.” Keller, supra note 123. 
Christians believe “we’re saved through . . . Jesus Christ . . . . He gave up his glory 
and became a human being, he gave up his life and he went to the cross and died 
on the cross, as he was dying, saying: father, forgive them.” Id. “[O]ur society, which 
is producing self-actuali[z]ers, self-asserters . . . need[s] millions of people who’ve 
been shaped by the self-giving of Jesus Christ, who say: I’m a Christian because of 
Jesus’ self-giving and we’re able to say therefore I live for God and for my 
neighbour . . . .” Id. 
 179. Keller, How Do Christians Fit?, supra note 178. If racism is sinful because 
it violates the biblical concept of love, one might question the efficacy of law to 
promote genuine godliness. I once did so. Calhoun, supra note 2, at 305. Now, 
however, I find Martin Luther King convincing on this point: 
Now the other myth that is disseminated is the idea that 
legislation . . . cannot really solve the problem of racial injustice, only 
education and religion can do that. Now certainly a half-truth is involved 
here: if the problem is to be solved ultimately, hearts must be changed 
and religion and education must play a great role . . . . But it is merely a 
half-truth, for it may be true that morality cannot be legislated, but 
behavior can be regulated. It may be true that the law cannot change the 
heart but it can restrain the heartless. It may be true that the law cannot 
make a man love me but it can keep him from lynching me . . . . In other 
words, through legislation we control the external effects of bad internal 
attitudes; and so it is necessary in society to have legislation . . . .  
Martin Luther King, Jr., The American Dream: A Speech Given by the Rev. Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. at Drew University (Feb. 5, 1964), 
https://depts.drew.edu/lib/archives/online_exhibits/king/speech/theamericandream
.pdf.   
 180. Keller, How Do Christians Fit?, supra note 178. Keller cautions Christians 
not to label any political party “as the only Christian one.” Id. One reason is “that 
most political positions are not matters of biblical command but of practical 
wisdom.” Id. For example, although Christians are commanded to help the poor, 
there are “many possible ways” to do so. Id. “The Bible does not give exact answers 
to [such] questions for every time, place and culture.” Id. Another reason not to label 
any single political party as Christian is that today “parties insist that you cannot 
work on one issue with them if you don’t embrace all of their approved positions.” 
Id. This package-deal approach “puts pressure on Christians in 
politics . . . [because] [t]he historical Christian positions on social issues do not fit 
into contemporary political alignments.” Id. See also Keller, supra note 35.   
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True, but Keller does quote Scripture to identify moral violations 
that Christians must combat through “political engagement.”181 He 
therefore obviously doesn’t view using overt Christian arguments as 
incompatible with the Gospel.182 
I’m glad to join Keller, unconstrained by erroneous 
interpretations of separation of church and state, in proclaiming the 
appropriateness of Christians’ using openly Christian arguments in 
fulfilling their duty to take a stand on the moral issues of our day.183 
And Keller is also right to recognize that Christians’ doing so is 
entirely compatible with fidelity to the glorious Gospel of Jesus 
Christ.184 
                                                                                                     
 181. Keller, How Do Christians Fit?, supra note 178. See supra notes 179–180 
and accompanying text.  
 182. At the end of his New York Times piece, Keller in fact shares the Gospel. 
He doesn’t, however, present doing so as a prerequisite for all Christians who use 
explicitly religious arguments in a political context. Instead, Keller uses the Gospel 
to offer comfort to Christians who may “experience exclusion and persecution” for 
our political participation. Id. It’s the “Gospel [that] gives us the resources to love 
people who reject both our beliefs and us personally. Christians should think of how 
God rescued them. He did it not by taking power but by coming to earth, losing glory 
and power, serving and dying on a cross.” Id. Support for concluding that Keller 
doesn’t consider explicit Gospel-sharing a mandatory component of all Christian 
political engagement is found in his praise for Martin Luther King, who urged 
political action to combat “sinful” segregation. See supra note 175 and 
accompanying text. In condemning segregation via this pejorative  religious 
classification, King neither shared the Gospel himself nor urged his followers to do 
so when they opposed the practice. King, American Dream, supra note 175. The 
same two points are true regarding King’s earlier address, with the same name and 
similar content, to a secular audience. King, supra note 179. And the same can be 
said about the King publication probably reprinted more than any other. See Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Letter From A Birmingham Jail, in I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS 
AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 84, 100 (James Melvin Washington ed., 
1992) (referring several times to Jesus, the crucifixion, and the Gospel, but never 
speaking of the Christian belief that salvation requires one’s trusting that Jesus’s 
death on the Cross paid the penalty for one’s sins). 
 183. It’s not my position that Christians must rely exclusively upon overtly 
Christian arguments. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 484 n.150. To the contrary, 
prudence might dictate exclusively secular arguments in some circumstances, 
although I have misgivings about this approach. Id.; see also id. at 463 n.11. 
 184. Keller and King both demonstrate their view that there’s no requirement 
explicitly to share the Gospel on such occasions. See supra note 182. Keller’s New 
York Times example, however, also offers encouragement to Christians to share the 
Gospel whenever the overall situation makes it appropriate to do so. Id. For two 
other occasions when Keller included a Gospel presentation when speaking about 
Christians’ political responsibilities, see Keller, supra note 35; Keller, supra note 
123.  
